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Abstract: Taking more than 600 enterprises as example, this paper analyzes the influence of 
managers’ features on the relationship between ownership structure and technical innovation of the 
firm. The authors find that the managers’ care to owners benefit (Emc) and the managers’ talent(Ta) 
have positive influence on firm technical innovation (Inte), and the ownership share of different 
kinds of owners have different effects on Emc and Ta. Therefore, ownership structure can not only 
directly influence the technical innovation of the enterprises, but also influence it indirectly. 
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Résumé: Prenant en exemple plus de 600 entreprises, ce document present analyse l’ influence des 
caractéristiques des managers sur les relations entre la structure possessive et l’innovation 
technique des entreprises. Les auteurs trouvent que l’attention des managers aux intérêts des 
possédants (Emc) et le talent des managers (Ta) effectue une influence positive sur l’ innovation 
techniquel des entreprises(Inte), et le partage possessif de possédants de toutes les sortes a de 
differents effects sur Emc et Ta. Cependant, la structure possessive peut influencer l’innovation 
technique des entreprises directement à la fois indirectement. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Technical innovation is regarded as the key for 
enterprises to improve their competitive ability (Rita 
Gunther McGrath,1996). In order to enhance technical 
innovation of the firms, the function of managers of the 
firms should be taken into account（J. A. Schumpeter，
1934）, and the influence of the ownership structure on 
firm technical innovation should be paid more attention 
to(Shaker A. Zahra,2000;B. J. Bushee, 1998). 
But, the theoretical or empirical research of the 
relationship between the ownership structure and firm 
technical innovation is rare（Nicola Lacetera，2001；
Barry D. Baysinger, et al.,1991）, and the research of the 
effects of managers’ features on the relationship is even 
infrequently. 
In this paper we’ll study the influences of ownership 
structure on managers’ features, and how the ownership 
structure affects corporate technical innovation (Inte) 
through managers’ features. We have 5 parts in this 
paper, part 2 is the theoretical analysis and hypothesis, 
part 3 is the research method, including data source and 
variable measure, part 4 is the research result, and part 5 
is the discussion and conclusion.  
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2.  THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND 
HYPOTHESIS 
 
To Chinese enterprise in period of economy system 
reforming , the managers’ features can influence the 
firm technical innovation(Inte), and the ownership 
structure have effects on managers’ features. Research 
on the separation between ownership and control (A. 
Berle & G. Means，1933; Williamson, O. E., 1975) 
indicates that the reason why the owners hire managers 
to take part in the technical innovation is to make use of 
the managers’ talent, and opportunism of the hired 
managers may harm the owners’ benefit. Therefore, the 
managers’ care to the owners benefit (Emc) and the 
managers’ talent may have influence on the corporate 
technical innovation. 
Harold Demsets(2001) argues that the function of 
the adjustment of property right is that of guiding 
incentives to a greater internalization of externalities . 
So the adjustment of ownership structure has two kinds 
of function (figure 1): to influence Emc through its 
effect on the owners’ motive to monitor the hired 
managers, and to influence Ta through selecting 
managers by the owners. The cost (time, money, and 
energy) for the owners to perform the first kind of 
function is distributed averagely through the whole 
process of the owners supervision to the managers, and 
the cost of the second kind is usually pooled in period of 
selecting the managers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1Influence of the ownership structure on corporate technical innovation through managers’ features 
 
2.2  Technical innovation of the firm and 
managers’ features  
2.1.1 Technical innovation of the firm (Inte) and 
managers’ talent (Ta) 
The managers' talent (Ta) is the premise of firm technical 
innovation (Inte). In Schumpeter’ s innovation theory (J. 
A. Schumpeter , 1934), innovation is the main function 
of the entrepreneur, and to achieve this function the 
entrepreneur must has outstanding talent in judgment, 
decision, organizing and allocating resources. In his 
theory on entrepreneur’s talent, Keznill said that the 
reason why a entrepreneur is a entrepreneur is that he has 
the ability to find the potential profit. When they 
analyzed the separation of ownership and control, Berle 
& Means(A. Berle & G. Means,1933) ,and Williamson 
(Williamson,O. E., 1975), implied that the reason why 
the owners hire the managers to innovate rather than 
innovate themselves even when the managers might 
pursue their own goal, is to make full use of the 
managers’ s talent.  Some other scholars also thinks that 
the managers’ talent is important for innovation (Amir K., 
Abadi Ghaidim, 1999), for example, Ester argues that a 
manager’s capability will influence his choice on the 
type of innovation (Ester Martinez-Ros, 2000); and some 
scholars state that the absence of managers’ talent is the 
obstacle of innovation and the excellent talent of the 
managers is very important for product innovation of a 
firm(Win E. Souder, et al., 1999).  
In fact, technical innovation of a firm has high 
risk(from Mansfield’ s point, 88% innovative activity 
fails (Yoser Gadhoum ,1999)),it lacks routine rules to 
follow, and it needs many resources to input, ——these 
features of technical innovation require excellent talent 
of the participants otherwise the innovative activity will 
fails. As the corporate managers are the center in 
allocating innovative resources and organizing 
innovative activity, the managers’ excellent talent is 
necessary for corporate technical innovation. Therefore, 
we have , 
Hypothesis 1: The talent of the corporate managers 
(Ta) has positive influence on corporate technical 
innovation (Inte). 
2.1.2 Firm technical innovation (Inte) and the 
extent of manager’s care to owners’ benefit 
(Emc) 
The success of firm technical innovation depends greatly 
on if the managers pay enough care to the owners’ 
benefit. Especially in this time when the separation of 
ownership and control is a widely spread phenomenon, 
the extent of managers’ care to owners’ benefit (Emc) 
will greatly influence whether the talent of the managers 
could be made full use of in corporate technical 
innovation (Inte). Mansfield regarded that the managers 
would reduce input on innovation if they only care for 
their own interest and evade risk of innovation(Yoser 
Gadhoum, 1999), and Gamble agreed to his point( John 
E. Gamble, Journal of Business Venturing 15) . Daniel 
argued that the managers’ attitude to risk would 
Owners’ supervision to the 
hired managers 
Selecting managers by the 
owners 
Emc 
Ta 
Inte Ownership 
structure of 
the enterprise 
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influence the corporate innovation (Daniel A. Rogers, 
2002). When explaining the relationship between 
institute ownership and R&D spending, Hansen and Hill 
stated that large outside owners supervise and urge the 
managers to increase R&D spending to pursue high 
profit, even if the risk of innovation is also high (G. S. 
Hansen & C. W. L. Hill, 1991). Because that innovation 
needs generous and continued invest with the supporting 
of managers(R. Kanter,1986; D. F.  Kuratko , et al.,1997), 
it will not success unless the managers have more care 
for the owners’ benefit and provide their supporting to 
innovation. The theory of agency (Jensen, Michael C. & 
Meckling, 1976) tells us that when the interest of owners 
and that of managers are tied closely, the supporting of 
managers to innovation will increase and the result in 
innovation will also increase. Besides, when studying 
product innovation, Gary Tighe also found that the 
managers’ attitude to job is positively related to 
innovation(Gary Tighe, 1998) .  
Because of above reasons, we have, 
Hypothesis 2: The extent of managers’ care to 
owners’ benefit (Emc) is positively related to corporate 
technical innovation (Inte). 
2.1.3The managers’ talent (Ta) and the extent of 
managers’ care to owners’ benefit (Emc) 
The extent of managers’ care to owners’ benefit (Emc) 
can influence their talent (Ta). This is because that the 
talent or ability of the managers is the result of their study, 
and this study can happen before the managers were 
hired as managers, or happen after that. The theory of 
study tells us that the attitude of members in a 
organization will affect their enthusiasm and efficiency 
in improving their talent for the organizational 
goals(Garvin, D. A., 1993) , so, the more attentions the 
managers pay to the owners’ benefit, the more desires 
they have to improve their talent or capability by method 
of “learning by doing”(K. Arrow, 1962) (or other kinds 
of methods) for corporate benefit. Therefore, we provide 
hypothesis 3, 
Hypothesis 3: the extent of managers’ care to the 
owners’ benefit (Emc) is positively related to their talent 
(Ta). 
 
2.2 Ownership structure and managers’ 
features 
2.2.1 Ownership structure and Emc 
Ownership shares of different kinds of owners causes 
different allocation of costs and profits among the 
owners(Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 
1976) , and therefore will influence the motive for the 
owners to inspire or supervise the extent of managers’ 
care to owners’ benefit (Emc). Demsetz regards property 
rights as the right to benefit or harm oneself or the others 
(Harold Demsets ,2001), and argues that a primary 
function of property right is that of guiding incentives to 
a greater internalization of externalities. To our point, 
ownership shares of managers or other owners just have 
the function of guiding incentives to a greater 
internalization of externalities.  
First, ownership shares of managers(Sm) and Emc 
The increase of managers’ ownership shares will help 
to improve Emc. Some research finds that the less 
ownership shares of the managers, the more possibility 
of their opportunism(Joseph T. L, 2000); and a certain 
quantity of ownership shares can reduce the managers’ 
opportunism motive by binding their benefit with that of 
the owners more closely(Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, 
William H.,1976; Ki C. Han, et al., 1998; Robert De 
Young, et al., 2001; Helen Short, et al., 1999; Shaker A. 
Zahra, 2000) .  
Some scholars state that in a certain range of 
managers’ ownership shares, the increase of the 
ownership shares of the corporate managers might cause 
increased control-right of the managers and strengthen 
the manager s’ ability to perform opportunism 
activity(John M. Griffith,et al., 1999;Ki C. Han, et al., 
1998; Robert De Young, et al., 2001; Helen Short, et al., 
1999) . But as to Chinese enterprises, to our point, the 
problem of “control by internal persons” in these 
enterprises is mainly caused by the absence of outside 
supervision, and no research finds that this problem is 
caused by the managers’ ownership shares.    
Therefore, we have, 
Hypothesis 4(a): The fraction of ownership shares of 
managers(Sm) is positively related to Emc. 
Second, Ownership shares of other kinds of owners 
and Emc 
The efficiency of different kinds of owners in 
supervising the managers is different. To different kinds 
of owners, the agent levels between initial creditors and 
the enterprise is different, and the ability to supervise the 
enterprises is also different. The more levels between 
initial creditors and the enterprise, the more difference 
between the goal of the initial creditors and that of the 
enterprise, and the less efficiency of the initial creditors 
in supervising the managers. 
The ownership shares of government (Sg) will not 
help to guarantee the Emc. The agency levels between 
the initial creditors (the public) of the government owner 
and the enterprise are more than that between the initial 
creditors of other kinds of owners and the enterprise. 
Besides, the government officers usually have only 
limited knowledge and information in supervising 
activity of the firm, and different departments of the 
government may have deputation on who represent the 
owner of national capital in the enterprise, and the 
government has to consider some other goals rather than 
economic goal(Maxim Boycko, et al.,2001; Anne O. 
Krueger, 1990).     
Therefore, we have, 
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Hypothesis 4(b): The fraction of ownership shares of 
the government (Sg) is negatively related to Emc. 
The ownership shares of legal person (Sl) will help to 
guarantee Emc. Legal person owners in China include 
some parts that have fewer agency levels (for example, 
the legal person that is a enterprise). So, the legal person 
owners as a whole will pay more attention to the 
manager’s activity if they have more ownership 
shares(Xiaonian Xu, Yan Wang, 1999) . Besides, 
Chinese legal person owners appeared in the period of 
economy system reforming, and it is a focal point of the 
whole society, which means that the attention from the 
society will force the managers to consider the owners’ 
benefit more. 
Therefore, we have , 
Hypothesis 4(c): The fraction of ownership shares of 
legal person (Sl) is positively related to Emc. 
2.2.2 Ownership structure and Ta 
The reason why the owners hire managers to innovation 
even when the separation of ownership and control may 
cause difference of their goals (A. Berle & G. Means , 
1993), is to obtain and to utilize the managers’ talent (Ta) 
or ability. Bruten found that the absence of talent is one 
of the main reasons why the managers are retired (Gary 
D. Bruten ,et al. , 2000). As the mechanism of choosing 
managers has its defects, only those owners who are 
willing to and are able to pay necessary cost to choose 
managers can guarantee the hired managers have high 
talent. 
Firstly, let’s look at the influence of managers’ 
ownership shares on Ta. Ta is positively related to the 
ownership shares of managers(Sm). When the managers 
of the enterprise own more ownership shares, their goal 
will be more consistent with that of the whole 
owners(Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William 
H.,1976; Ki C. Han, et al., 1998; Robert De Young, et al., 
2001; Helen Short, et al., 1999; Shaker A. Zahra, 2000) . 
For their own interest, if their talent is poor they will not 
take on the responsibility of management because the 
loss will be more endured by themselves, and if their 
talent in managing the firm is high they will actively take 
on the responsibility of management because more 
benefit will be shared by themselves. Therefore, we 
have, 
Hypothesis 5(a): The fraction of ownership shares of 
managers(Sm) is positively related to Ta. 
Secondly, the influence of the ownership shares of 
other kinds of owners is mainly embodied in choosing 
management. According to the theory of study(Garvin, 
D. A., 1993) , talent is the result of study, and the 
managers’ talent may come from the study after they are 
hired (when different kinds of owners may influence the 
managers’ talent indirectly through Emc, as we have 
talked about above), or come from the study before the 
managers are hired(when different kinds of owners may 
influence the managers’ talent directly by choosing 
managers who have accumulated talent from their 
quondam experience). Different from supervising 
managers’ daily activity, it is not a frequently activity for 
the owners to choose managers, and the owners only 
need to pay cost once or limited times for choosing 
managers. The kinds of owners who are able to pay this 
kind of cost can choose managers efficiently, and the 
kinds of owners who are not able to pay this kind of cost 
cannot guarantee high talent of the chosen managers. 
Among all the owners, the ownership shares of the social 
public will not help to choose managers who have high 
talent efficiently. Limited knowledge and information on 
innovation, dispersed capital, and lack of organization, 
are all barriers that prevent the public to choose 
managers efficiently. 
Therefore, 
Hypothesis 5(b): The fraction of ownership shares of 
the public (Spu) is negatively related to Ta. 
Different from the scattered public, the ownership 
shares of some kinds of owners, such as the government, 
the legal person, the proprietor of the enterprise (in China, 
proprietor usually means large outside private owner), 
and foreign investor, may contribute to choose qualified 
managers. These kinds of owners have advantages in 
capital and social relationship , therefore, they can make 
full use of these advantages to choose managers 
themselves or to invite relative specialist to choose 
qualified managers for them. As to the government, it 
can utilize its advantage to obtain enough information 
about candidate, and get supporting from relative 
departments or specialist. To the legal person owner, it 
appeared with the progress of Chinese enterprise 
reforming, and the whole society pays attention closely 
to them; besides, it usually have advantage in fund and 
social relationship. The proprietor usually has more 
opulent fund than the public owners, and its ownership is 
more concentrated than that of the public, therefore, the 
proprietor will be willing and able to make sure that the 
chosen managers have essential talent if he has more 
ownership shares. As to the foreign investor, he has 
vantages in capital, international relationship, and 
management thinking, which will enable him to select 
suitable persons to be the corporate managers. 
. So we have, 
Hypothesis 5(c): The fraction of ownership shares of 
government (Sg) is positively related to Ta. 
Hypothesis 5(d): The fraction of ownership shares of 
legal persons (Sl) is positively related to Ta. 
Hypothesis 5(e): The fraction of ownership shares of 
proprietor (Spr) is positively related to Ta. 
Hypothesis 5(f): The fraction of ownership shares of 
foreign investors (Sf) is positively related to Ta. 
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2.3 The direct relationship between 
ownership structure and firm technical 
innovation 
    As we have discussed above, the ownership structure 
of enterprises can influence firm technical innovation 
(Inte) indirectly through managers’ features. 
Furthermore, it can influence firm technical innovation 
directly, because it may has influence on other 
participant of the innovation(Henry Hansman , 1996). 
    Among all kinds of owners, managers who have 
ownership shares have more obvious advantages in 
directly influencing the innovation of technology than 
other kinds of owners.  As participant of corporate 
technical innovation(J. A. Schumpeter,1934) , the 
manager usually has more experience and knowledge in 
innovation, which will help him to find out the possible 
opportunism of other participants and prevent their 
opportunism to harm the owners’ interest. Therefore, 
more ownership shares of the managers will strengthen 
their motive to supervise other participants of the 
innovation and directly contribute to technical 
innovation of the enterprise. 
Hypothesis 6(a): The fraction of ownership shares of 
managers(Sm) is directly and positively related to 
technical innovation of the enterprise (Inte). 
The government’s ownership will harm the technical 
innovation of the firm directly. As a owner of the 
enterprise, the more agency levels between the initial 
creditors (the public) of the government and the 
enterprise will reduce the supervisory incentive of the 
government officials. Besides, the limited knowledge 
and information of government officials about 
innovation, the deputation among different departments 
of the government on who represent the owner of 
national capital in enterprises, and other goals of the 
government (for example, goal of full employment) 
rather than the economic goal (Maxim Boycko, et al., 
2001; Anne O. Krueger,1990) , may all go against the 
technical innovation. Therefore, we have, 
Hypothesis 6(b): The fraction of ownership shares of 
government (Sg) is directly and negatively related to 
technical innovation of the enterprise (Inte). 
    Ownership shares of the public may be also 
detrimental to the technical innovation directly. 
Supervision on technical innovation needs specialized 
knowledge, especially knowledge about relative 
technology and science, but usually the social public 
lacks of this kind of knowledge. Moreover, the public is 
not organized, and its fraction of ownership shares is 
scattered which diminishes the supervision incentive of 
the public owners. Therefore,  
Hypothesis 6(c): The fraction of ownership shares of 
the public (Spu) is directly and negatively related to 
technical innovation of the enterprise (Inte). 
 
3.  METHODS 
 
3.1Data source and collection of data 
Data used in this paper come from an investigation on 
running circumstances of Chinese enterprises from 1997 
to 2001. The investigation involves enterprises from  
Guangdong, Liaoning, Shandong, Shannxi, Shanxi, and 
Sichuan provinces . The involved industries include 
electronics, petrifaction, materials, food, printing, fabric, 
and so on. The enterprises involved include state-owned 
or state-controlled enterprises, foreigner-invested 
enterprises, private enterprises, stock companies, village 
enterprises. 805 questionnaires were distributed and 607 
valid questionnaires were returned back, which means 
that about 75% of the distributed questionnaires are 
valid. 
In order to make sure that the collected data is 
reliable, help from government was obtained, and items 
of the questionnaire were tested before formal 
investigation. Besides, the collected data were judged 
and selected according as whether the data were 
unfeigned and valid. The judged and selected data were 
inputted into database to become the sample of our study. 
The investigation was performed by visiting, email, or 
fax. 
 
3.2 Variable measure 
Corporate technical innovation (Inte) Technical 
innovation includes product innovation and innovation 
in technical process(Peter Witt, 1998). Product 
innovation is the innovation in capability , type, 
appearance, or service of the product(D. D. Roman and J. 
F. Puett, 1983), and the technical innovation can come 
from the innovative activity of the enterprise, or come 
from the outside of the enterprise(Peter Witt, 1998; H. 
Albach,1994) . In our research, Inte is represented by the 
following aspects: ( ⅰ )brand-new product 
innovation,(ⅱ) gradual improvement in capability, type, 
appearance, or service of the product, ( ⅲ ) new 
technology come from the outside of the enterprise, (ⅳ) 
new technology invented by the enterprise. In this study, 
Inte is a composite index constructed from these aspects 
by factor analysis, and αin reliable analysis is 0.7986, 
KMO is 0.810. 
Managers’ care to owners’ benefit (Emc) Emc is an 
item of the questionnaire, it can be obtained directly from 
the database. 
Talent of the managers (Ta)  According to Robin 
Snell, et al.( Robin Snell, Agnes Lau, 1994; Chao C. 
Chen, et al., 1998), in this study Ta is represented by the 
following aspects: (ⅰ) the ability of the managers to get 
information of market demand accurately,（ⅱ）time and 
energy which the managers spend in serving the clients, 
(ⅲ )ability of the managers to judge accurately the 
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change in market demand, ( ⅳ )the ability of the 
managers to catch the business chance, (ⅴ) the ability of 
the managers to control the future of the enterprise, 
(ⅵ )the ability to organize and encourage the staff 
efficiently, ( ⅶ )the ability to supervise the staff 
efficiently, (ⅷ )the ability to organize the resources 
efficiently, (ⅸ)the ability to identify the talent of the 
staff,(ⅹ)the ability to run the enterprise smoothly. Ta  is 
a composite index constructed from these 10 aspects by 
factor analysis, and α in reliable analysis is 0.9419, 
KMO is 0.934. 
    Ownership share of each kind of owners (Sm,  Sg, 
Sl,  Spr,  Spu,  and Sf) Sm, Sg, Sl, Spr, Spu, and 
 Sf respectively stands for the fraction of ownership 
shares of managers, of government, of legal person, of  
proprietor, of the public, or of the foreigners. 
According to Chowdhury (Shamsud D. Chowdhury, et 
al., 2001), 
they are respectively valued by averaging the fraction 
of ownership share of the relative owner in 1997,  
1999, and 2001 in the enterprise. 
Corporate size(Size) Variable Size in our study is a 
control variable. According to Tosi and Katz (H. Tosi,& 
L. Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Jeffrey P. Katz,1995) , Size in 
our study is a composite index constructed from assets, 
sales, number of employees by factor analysis. And αin 
reliable analysis is 0.9419, KMO is 0.934. 
 
4.RESULTS 
 
Table 1 Results of analysis 
 
Innovation in 
technology (Inte) 
Talent of 
managers(Ta) 
Extent of managers’ care to 
owners’ benefit (Emc) 
Dependent 
variables 
 
Independent 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Extent of managers’ care 
to owners’ benefit(Emc) 
0.115** 0.119** 0.139** —— —— 
Talent of managers (Ta) 0.071+ 0.075+ —— —— —— 
Ownership shares of 
managers (Sm) 
0.086* 0.086* 0.104* ０.099* 0.075+ 
Ownership shares of 
government (Sg) 
-0.089* -0.105* 0.151** -0.108** -0.104* 
Ownership shares of 
legal person (Sl) 
—— -0.043 0.058 0.101* 0.095* 
Ownership shares of 
proprietor (Spr) 
—— -0.011 0.085+ —— 0.055 
Ownership shares of the 
public (Spu) 
-0.094* -0.082* -0.072+ —— 0.051 
Ownership shares of the 
foreigners (Sf) 
—— -0.009 0.086* —— 0.012 
Corporate size (Size) 0.333** 0.334** —— —— —— 
Adj. R2 15.5 15.2 9.0 8.8 8.9 
F 19.490** 13.094** 4.591** 9.021** 5.082** 
Note：+ p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. Estimates are standardized.
Table 1 is the results of regression analysis with Emc, Ta, 
and Inte to be the dependent variable respectively.  
The analytical results of Model 1 show that both Emc 
and Ta have positive effects on Inte. Moreover, the 
fraction of ownership shares of managers is directly and 
positively related to Inte, while that of the government or 
of the public is directly and negatively related to Inte. 
Hence, hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2, hypothesis 6(a), 
hypothesis 6(b), and hypothesis 6(c), are all proved. In 
order to find the possible direct effects of the ownership 
shares of other kinds of owners on Inte, we further 
studied Model 2 by regression analysis. No evident was 
found to prove that the ownership shares of other kinds 
of owners (legal person, proprietor, or the foreigner) had 
directly effects on Inte, while the effects of ownership 
shares of the managers, of the government, or of the 
public on Inte, were proved again. 
The analytical results of Model 3 show that the 
ownership shares of the managers, of the government, of 
the proprietor, or of the foreigners, have positively 
effects on Ta, and the ownership shares of the public has 
negatively effects on Ta. But the results don’t show that 
the ownership shares of legal person has obvious 
influence on Ta. Besides, the results show that the extent 
of managers’ care to the owners’ benefits will contribute 
to Ta. Hence, hypothesis 3, hypothesis 5(a), hypothesis 
5(b), hypothesis 5(c), hypothesis 5(e), and hypothesis 
5(f), are all proved, but hypothesis 5(d) is not proved. 
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From the analytical result of Model 4, we know that 
the increment of the fraction of ownership shares of 
management or of legal persons will help to increase 
Emc, while that of government has negative influence on 
Emc. So hypothesis 4(a), hypothesis 4(b), and hypothesis 
4(c) are all proved. In order to find the possible effects of 
the ownership shares of other kinds of owners on Emc, 
we further studied Model 5 by regression analysis. No 
evident was found to prove that the ownership shares of 
other kinds of owners (the proprietor, the public, or the 
foreigner) had obviously effects on Emc, while the 
effects of ownership shares of the managers, of the 
government, or of the legal person on Emc, were proved 
again. 
5.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
From the analysis above, all the hypothesis are proved 
except for hypothesis 5(d).  
The proved results, that Ta and Emc are positively 
related to Inte, conform to traditional theory. From the 
innovation theory, innovation is an important function of 
the managers, therefore, the talent of the manager and the 
extent of his care to the owners benefit will influence 
firm technical innovation. And from the agency theory, 
the managers’ talent is the premise of agency relationship 
between the owners and the managers, and once the 
managers are hired, the extent of managers’ care to 
owners’ benefit will has influence on Inte. From the view 
of corporate resource, the managers’ human resource is a 
kind of rare resource, so Ta and Emc can also be regarded 
as rare resource in the innovation activity; according to 
the law of diminish of marginal benefit, increment of Ta 
and of Emc will contribute to Inte. Besides, in model 1 or 
in model 2, β of Emc is bigger than β of Ta, this may 
implies that, as for technical innovation of Chinese firms, 
the attitude of the managers to owner’s benefit may be 
more important than the managers’ talent.  
The analytical result on Emc conform to agency 
theory. From the point of agency, when a manager is a 
owner of the enterprise, he is the initial creditor of his 
own, and the agency levels between initial creditor(the 
manager, when he is the owner) and the enterprise is less ; 
but to the government owner, the agency levels between 
its initial creditor(the public, that are the owners) and the 
enterprise is more. Therefore, the supervising efficiency 
of the government owner to Emc is lower than that of the 
manager owner to Emc. As for the legal person owners, 
the agency levels between their initial creditor and the 
enterprise is less than that of the government owner; 
besides, the legal person owners appeared with Chinese 
economy system reforming, attention from the 
government and the society forces the managers to care 
about the owners’ benefit much more.  
The point of agency theory cannot explain the 
analytical result on Ta. From the agency theory, the 
agency levels between the initial creditors of the 
government owner and the enterprise is more, and that 
between the initial creditor of the public and the 
enterprise is relatively less. But the research result shows 
that the fraction of ownership share of government is 
positively related to Ta, and that of the public is 
negatively related to Ta. The theory of study tells us that  
people’s talent is the result of their study(Garvin, D. A., 
1993), so the manager’s talent may come from his study 
before he was hired as the manager when the agency 
relationship between the owners and him didn’t exist. 
Moreover, as the manager’s talent may come from his 
study before he was hired, the owners can influence 
manager’s talent by selecting person who has high talent 
to be the manager, and those owners that have the ability 
to select suitable person and are willing to pay the 
necessary selecting cost will influence Ta positively. 
Different from the owners’ supervision on Emc, the cost 
in selecting suitable managers by owners is centralized in 
the period of selection, therefore when the government 
has more ownership shares it will be able to pay the cost 
and to select the high talent managers more efficiently by 
using the resources it masters; and when the public 
whose ownership share is scattered has more ownership 
share, the public owners as a whole cannot pay the 
centralized cost and cannot select the high talent 
managers efficiently. 
The reason why hypothesis 5(d)(the positive effects 
of ownership shares of legal person on Ta) is not proved, 
may be that in period of economic reforming, the 
influence of ownership shares of legal person on Ta is 
indirect through Emc. To prove this point, we analyzed 
Model 3 by getting rid of Emc, and found that the effect 
of legal person’ s ownership shares on Ta became 
marginally obvious when Emc was not included in 
Model 3, which means that Emc may undertake a 
mediating role between ownership shares of legal person 
and Ta. Especially, when we got rid of Emc in Model 3 
and at the same time considered of the possible effects of 
industry stage on Ta, the effect of ownership shares of 
legal person on Ta became obviously positive.    
From the research, we have the following 
conclusions: 
1st. Both the talent of managers (Ta) and the 
extent of managers’ care to owners’ benefit (Emc) are 
positively related to corporate innovation in 
technology (Inte). 
2nd. Ownership shares of the managers (Sm), 
of the government (Sg), of the proprietor (Spr), or of 
the foreigners (Sf), as well as Emc(extent of 
managers’ care to owners’ benefit), have all  positive 
effects on the managers’ talent(Ta); while ownership 
shares of the public has negative effects on Ta. 
Ownership shares of legal persons has no direct 
effects on Ta, but it has indirect effects on Ta through 
Emc. 
3rd. The increment of the ownership shares of 
the managers or of the legal persons, will increase the 
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extent of managers’ care to owners’ benefit (Emc), 
while that of the government will bring down Emc.  
4th. Apart from the indirect influences of 
ownership shares on technical innovation (Inte) 
through managers’ features (Emc and Ta), ownership 
shares of different kinds of owners have direct effects 
on Inte. In particular, ownership shares of managers 
has direct and positive effects on Inte, while that of 
the government or of the public has direct but 
negative effects on Inte. 
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